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THE PREEMPTION OF STATE TAXES UNDER BRACKER, 
THE INDIAN TRADER STATUTES, AND THE INDIAN 
GAMING REGULATORY ACT 
EDWARD A. LOWE 
The Indian Tribes of the United States occupy an often ambiguous 
place in our legal system, and nowhere is that ambiguity more pronounced 
than in the realm of state taxation. States are, for the most part, preempted 
from taxing the Indian Tribes, but something unique happens when the 
state attempts to levy a tax on non-Indian vendors employed by a Tribe for 
work on a reservation. The state certainly has a significant justification for 
imposing its tax on non-Indians, but at what point does the non-Indian 
vendor’s relationship with the Tribe impede the state’s right to tax? What 
happens when the taxed activity is a sale to the Tribe? And what does it 
mean when the taxed activity has connections to Indian Gaming?  
This Comment explores three preemption standards as they were 
interpreted by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in a case between the 
State of Connecticut and the Mashantucket Pequot Tribe. In deciding 
whether preemption was the legally required outcome, the Court looked to 
and applied the landmark preemption analysis case White Mountain 
Apache Tribe v. Bracker, the Indian Trader Statutes, and the Indian 
Gaming Regulatory Act. While more than one legally correct outcome 
exists in this case, this Comment endorses and argues in favor of 
preemption based on the application of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act 
and the preemption analysis required by Bracker. 
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MASHANTUCKET PEQUOT TRIBE V. TOWN OF LEDYARD: 
THE PREEMPTION OF STATE TAXES UNDER BRACKER, 
THE INDIAN TRADER STATUTES, AND THE INDIAN 
GAMING REGULATORY ACT 
EDWARD A. LOWE∗ 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The federal government has the power to regulate commerce with the 
Indian Tribes,1 and throughout most of the nineteenth century, Congress 
participated in that exclusive relationship as one nation would with any 
other sovereign entity—through the signing and ratification of treaties. 
These treaties, despite being disproportionately in favor of the United 
States,2 formed the basis for the treatment of the Indian Tribes as 
“domestic dependent nations”3 for almost a hundred years.4   
                                                                                                                          
∗ Eastern Connecticut State University, B.S. 2010; University of Connecticut School of Law, J.D. 
Candidate 2015. I would like to thank Professors Richard Pomp and Betsy Conway for suggesting this 
Comment topic to me and offering their insights and advice, the editors of the Connecticut Law Review 
for their thoughtful editing, and, most of all, my beautiful wife, Beverly, who inspires me every day. 
All errors contained herein are mine alone.    
1 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3. Congress has the power to “regulate Commerce with foreign 
Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.” Id. This assignment of power is 
collectively known as the Commerce Clause, and as the Foreign Commerce Clause, Interstate 
Commerce Clause, and Indian Commerce Clause individually. 
2 See, e.g., A Treaty of Perpetual Friendship, Cession and Limits, U.S.-Choctaw Nation, Sept. 27, 
1830, 7 Stat. 333 [hereinafter the Treaty of Dancing Rabbit Creek]. The Treaty of Dancing Rabbit 
Creek required the Choctaw to cede their lands east of the Mississippi River to the United States, and 
remove themselves to what is now Oklahoma. Id. This was one of the treaties that initiated the forced 
removal of Indian Tribes mandated by the Indian Removal Act, the Act responsible for the Trail of 
Tears. Act of May 28, 1830, ch. 148, 4 Stat. 411 (“[F]or an exchange of lands with the Indians residing 
in any of the states or territories, and for their removal west of the river Mississippi.”). 
3 Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831) (“Though the Indians are 
acknowledged to have an unquestionable, and, heretofore, unquestioned right to the lands they occupy, 
until that right shall be extinguished by a voluntary cession to our government; yet it may well be 
doubted whether those tribes which reside within the acknowledged boundaries of the United States 
can, with strict accuracy, be denominated foreign nations. They may, more correctly, perhaps, be 
denominated domestic dependent nations. They occupy a territory to which we assert a title 
independent of their will, which must take effect in point of possession when their right of possession 
ceases. Meanwhile they are in a state of pupilage. Their relation to the United States resembles that of a 
ward to his guardian.”) (emphasis added). 
4 Congress ended its policy of regulating the Indian Tribes through treaties in 1871. See Indian 
Apportionment Act of March 3, 1871, ch. 120, 16 Stat. 544, 566 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 71 (2012)) 
(“[H]ereafter no Indian nation or tribe within the United States shall be acknowledged or recognized as 
an independent nation, tribe, or power with whom the United States may contract by treaty.”). 
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Ever since Congress chose to end its policy of making treaties with the 
Indian Tribes, states have been permitted to exercise increased authority in 
the taxation of non-Indian activity within Indian country.5 Nevertheless, 
the authority of a state to impose a tax in Indian country is narrow, and for 
the most part, states lack the authority to tax Tribe members in Indian 
country without either the authorization of Congress or the permission of 
the Tribe. Of course, as this Comment will demonstrate, the ability of a 
state to tax even non-Indian activity within Indian country can be, and 
frequently is, preempted by the existence of federal law that specifically 
targets that activity. 
Federal laws restrict the states from engaging in several different 
interactions with Indian Tribes. One such federal restriction, formed by a 
series of laws collectively known as the Indian Trader Statutes,6 has been 
interpreted to forbid the imposition of state sales taxes on certain 
transactions involving reservation Indians. The Supreme Court of the 
United States determined as much in Warren Trading Post v. Arizona State 
Tax Commission,7 which asserted that the Indian Trader Statutes were 
“sufficient to show that Congress has taken the business of Indian trading 
on reservations so fully in hand that no room remains for state laws 
imposing additional burdens upon traders.”8 As the interpretation of these 
statues evolved, it was concluded that the simple existence of the Indian 
Trader Statutes “pre-empts the field of transactions with Indians occurring 
on reservations,” even in cases not involving federally licensed Indian 
traders.9   
Indian Tribes that are fortunate enough to participate in an Indian 
                                                                                                                          
5 See Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 361 (2001) (“State sovereignty does not end at a 
reservation’s border. Though tribes are often referred to as ‘sovereign’ entities, it was ‘long ago’ that 
‘the Court departed from Chief Justice Marshall’s view that ‘the laws of a State can have no force’ 
within reservation boundaries.”) (citations omitted). 
6 25 U.S.C. §§ 261–64 (2012). Popularly referred to as the “Indian Trader Statutes,” these laws 
were enacted to “protect Indians from becoming victims of fraud in dealings with persons selling 
goods.” Cent. Mach. Co. v. Ariz. State Tax Comm’n, 448 U.S. 160, 165 (1980). The Indian Trader 
Statutes have been rightly described as  
paternalistic and resented by many Indians and their supporters as reflecting the 
“guardian/ward relationship which places the federal government in the role of 
protector and the tribal members in a subordinated position requiring protection. By 
contrast, an analysis that includes considerations of tribal sovereignty places needed 
emphasis on the simple fact that a tribe is a government within the federal system 
and that its governmental integrity is worthy of consideration and encouragement.” 
Richard D. Pomp, The Unfulfilled Promise of the Indian Commerce Clause and State Taxation, 63 TAX 
LAW. 897, 1009 n.434 (2010) (quoting Scott A. Taylor, A Judicial Framework for Applying Supreme 
Court Jurisprudence to the State Income Taxation of Indian Traders, 2007 MICH. ST. L. REV. 841, 862 
(2007)). 
7 380 U.S. 685 (1965). 
8 Id. at 690. 
9 Cent. Mach. Co., 448 U.S. at 165. 
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gaming industry on their reservations have additional cause to challenge 
any state taxes that target their gaming operations. The federal government 
has a clear interest in regulating the gaming operations and economic 
development of the Indian Tribes. It was from this interest that the Indian 
Gaming Regulatory Act10 (IGRA) was born. In addition to regulating 
Indian gaming, the IGRA prohibits the states from levying taxes on Indian 
gaming operations in Indian country without Tribal consent.11   
Looming over every modern controversy concerning the exertion of 
state authority over non-Indian activity in Indian country is the preemption 
analysis laid out in White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker,12 which calls 
for the relevant federal, state, municipal, and Tribal interests at issue to be 
evaluated to determine whose interest is strongest, and therefore valid.13 
The preemption of a state tax imposed on a non-Indian contractor can only 
be realized through a Bracker test. The Indian Trader Statutes and IGRA 
weigh heavily in favor of the federal interest in their applicable cases. 
In Connecticut, a state that has often sought to exercise varying levels 
of authority over the Tribes within its borders,14 each municipality is 
responsible for collecting a property tax levied on the non-exempt tangible 
property within its jurisdiction.15 Leased property is included in the town’s 
assessment, with the tax burden falling on the owner of the property.16 The 
Mashantucket Pequot Tribe owns and operates the Foxwoods Resort 
                                                                                                                          
10 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701–21 (2012).   
11 See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3)(A) (2012) (“Any Indian tribe having jurisdiction over the Indian 
lands upon which a class III gaming activity is being conducted, or is to be conducted, shall request the 
State in which such lands are located to enter into negotiations for the purpose of entering into a Tribal-
State compact governing the conduct of gaming activities. Upon receiving such a request, the State 
shall negotiate with the Indian tribe in good faith to enter into such a compact.”). 
12 448 U.S. 136 (1980). 
13   
We have . . . rejected the proposition that in order to find a particular state law to 
have been pre-empted by operation of federal law, an express congressional 
statement to that effect is required. At the same time any applicable regulatory 
interest of the State must be given weight, and “automatic exemptions ‘as a matter 
of constitutional law’” are unusual. . . . This inquiry is not dependent on mechanical 
or absolute conceptions of state or tribal sovereignty, but has called for a 
particularized inquiry into the nature of the state, federal, and tribal interests at stake, 
an inquiry designed to determine whether, in the specific context, the exercise of 
state authority would violate federal law. 
Id. at 144–45 (citations omitted). 
14 See infra Part II.A (concerning cases involving the Mashantucket Pequot Tribe and 
Connecticut). 
15 CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 12-40–12-121z (2014). 
16 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 12-57a(a) (2014) (“Any personal property subject to a contract of 
lease . . . which property is in the possession of the lessee on any assessment day in the municipality in 
which the lessee resides, shall, for information purposes only, be included in the personal property 
declaration of the lessee . . . . [T]he lessee shall be required to include the name and address of the 
owner of such property and the term of the lease applicable thereto.”) (emphasis added).   
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Casino on the Mashantucket Pequot Reservation near the town of Ledyard, 
Connecticut.17 The casino hosts several games of chance, including over 
five thousand slot machines;18 many of which are leased from a handful of 
non-Indian gaming companies.19 Connecticut’s generally applied property 
tax would ordinarily be levied on these slot machines and be paid by the 
lessors, but the Mashantucket Pequot Tribe argues that the exclusive use of 
the leased slot machines for Indian gaming on their Reservation preempts 
the state’s property tax.20 
The preemptive power of the Indian Trader Statutes, the IGRA, and the 
Bracker analysis were put to the test in the case that is the subject of this 
Comment: Mashantucket Pequot Tribe v. Town of Ledyard.21 The Second 
Circuit Court of Appeals was unmoved by the Tribe’s preemption 
argument, holding that the state and municipal interest in enforcing the 
property tax outweighed any Tribal or federal interest.22 This was a notable 
divergence from the United States District Court for the District of 
Connecticut’s ruling, which found the tax to be preempted under the 
Bracker analysis, the IGRA, and the Indian Trader Statutes.23 It seems at 
first blush that there is a reasonable justification for both rulings. After all, 
both courts are presided over by some of the most intelligent legal minds 
of our time, but did either court get it right in the end? Does precedent 
                                                                                                                          
17 The location of the Reservation is usually referred to as either near or in Ledyard. The Second 
Circuit Court of Appeals has previously described Foxwoods Resort Casino as being in Ledyard, CT.  
E.g., Connecticut v. Dep’t. of Interior, 228 F.3d 82, 85 (2d Cir. 2000). For their part, the Tribe 
advertises the Foxwoods Resort Casino address as Mashantucket, CT. See Getting Here, FOXWOODS, 
http://www.foxwoods.com/gettinghere.aspx (last visited Sept. 24, 2014). Of course, the uncertainty of 
Connecticut’s authority to tax non-Indian property on the Reservation attests to the idea that the 
Reservation is not only separate from the town of Ledyard, but from the state of Connecticut as well.  
18 Slots, FOXWOODS, http://www.foxwoods.com/slots.aspx (last visited Sept. 24, 2014). 
19 The Tribe could more likely than not avoid a property tax completely by buying the slot 
machines, but many of the most popular “themed” slot machines are available by lease only. See Brief 
for the Mashantucket Pequot Tribe at 12, Mashantucket Pequot Tribe v. Town of Ledyard, 722 F.3d 
457 (2d Cir. 2013) (Nos. 12-1727, 12-1735). 
20 See infra Part II.B (describing the background of the Tribe’s complaint and their argument). 
21 722 F.3d 457 (2d Cir. 2013) [hereinafter Pequot III]. The state appealed from Mashantucket 
Pequot Tribe v. Town of Ledyard, No. 3:06cv10-12, 2012 WL 1069342 (D. Conn. Mar. 27, 2012) 
(Eginton, J.) [hereinafter Pequot II]. An additional action between the Tribe and the State, 
Mashantucket Pequot Tribe v. Town of Ledyard, No. 3:06cv10-12, 2007 WL 1238338 (D. Conn. Apr. 
25, 2007) (Eginton, J.) [hereinafter Pequot I], in which the district court denied the State’s motion to 
dismiss the case on comity and Tax Injunction Act grounds, is referred to as Pequot I in the Pequot III 
opinion. For the sake of uniformity, the shortened names given to the cases in Pequot III are identical 
in this Comment.   
22 Pequot III, 722 F.3d at 477 (“[T]he district court erred in determining that Connecticut’s 
generally-applicable personal property tax was barred by the Indian Trader Statutes, by IGRA, and 
pursuant to the Bracker test.”). 
23 Pequot II, 2012 WL 1069342 at *12 (“The motion for summary judgment will be granted in 
favor of the Tribe. The motions for summary judgment filed by the State and the Town will be 
denied.”). 
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dictate a single correct outcome to this controversy? Wuyeepuyôq,24 and 
welcome to that nebulous area where state taxation, the Indian Tribes, and 
federal preemption intersect.   
This Comment will analyze the decisions made in both the District 
Court and the Second Circuit Court of Appeals and the courts’ applications 
of the Indian Trader Statutes, the IGRA, and the Bracker preemption 
analysis. In Part II, this Comment discusses the recent history of the 
Mashantucket Pequot Tribe, the creation of the Foxwoods Resort Casino, 
and the series of events that led to the Tribe’s initial challenge. In Part III, 
this Comment summarizes the background, modern interpretation, and 
application of the three major preemption standards at issue in Pequot II 
and Pequot III.   
II.  BACKGROUND 
A.  The Mashantucket Pequot Tribe’s Modern History  
The Mashantucket Pequot Tribe was recognized by the federal 
government in 198325 and is currently one of two federally recognized 
Tribes in Connecticut.26 With their recognition, the Tribe was also granted 
                                                                                                                          
24 The phrase, pronounced “wee-ee-PEE-on-kwa” and meaning “come in a good way,” was the 
salutation of the Pequot Tribe, the historical predecessors of the modern Mashantucket Pequot Tribe.  
THE MASHANTUCKET (WESTERN) PEQUOT TRIBAL NATION, http://www.mashantucket.com (last visited 
Sept. 24, 2014).   
25 Mashantucket Pequot Indian Claims Settlement Act, Pub. L. No. 98-134, 97 Stat. 851 (1983) 
[hereinafter the Settlement Act] (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1751–60 (2012)).   
26 The Mohegan Tribe is the other federally recognized tribe in the state. Mohegan Nation of 
Connecticut Land Claims Settlement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-377, 108 Stat. 3501 (codified as 
amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1775–75h (2012)). During the Pequot War, fought between 1634 and 1638, 
the Mohegan allied with Connecticut colonists against the Pequot. The war ended with what was 
essentially the destruction of the Pequot Tribe. Most of the Pequot were killed, and the survivors were 
either taken in by local tribes or enslaved. 15 BRUCE G. TRIGGER, HANDBOOK OF NORTH AMERICAN 
INDIANS, Northeast at 172–73 (8th ed., 1978). The current Chairman of the Mashantucket Pequot 
Tribe, Rodney Butler, reported that “[t]here’s still some bad blood over [the Mohegan alliance with the 
colonists], a little animosity, but mostly, we recognize them as our cousins, and we work well 
together.” Michael Sokolove, A Big Bet Gone Bad, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 2012, at MM36. Today, the 
two tribes continue their rivalry on friendlier terms as competitors in the gaming industry. The 
Mashantucket Pequot and Mohegan Tribes own and operate Foxwoods Resort Casino and Mohegan 
Sun respectively, the two largest casinos in the Western hemisphere. Id. The slot machine lessors to the 
Mohegan Tribe, which include AC Coin and WMS, consistently pay the Connecticut property tax 
levied on slot machines leased to the Mohegan Tribe. Brief for the Town of Ledyard, Mashantucket 
Pequot Tribe v. Town of Ledyard, 722 F.3d 457 (2d Cir. 2013) (No. 12-1727), 2012 WL 3548136, at 
*7 (“ACC and WMS pay Montville taxes assessed on slot machines that they lease to the Mohegan Sun 
Casino, but at the urging of the Mashantucket Pequot Tribe, resist paying taxes to Ledyard on slot 
machines they lease to the Gaming Enterprise for use at Foxwoods.”). 
Two additional Connecticut Tribes had previously enjoyed federal recognition, albeit very briefly 
as their recognition was successfully challenged by the state of Connecticut at a time when gambling 
expansion in the state was a major political issue. The Schaghticoke Tribe was granted federal 
recognition in 2004, only to have that recognition reconsidered and rescinded a year later after 
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a settlement fund to purchase more than eight-hundred acres from 
landowners within a defined area around the Reservation to be taken in 
trust by the United States on behalf of the Tribe.27 As a newly recognized 
sovereign entity, the Tribe quickly created a system of governance, which 
included its own post office, fire department, police department, and the 
Mashantucket Pequot Tribal Court.28 Shortly after achieving federal 
recognition, the Tribe opened a bingo hall on the Reservation without first 
seeking regulatory approval from the state.29 Connecticut objected, 
                                                                                                                          
Connecticut successfully argued that the Schaghticoke Tribe did not meet the criteria for administrative 
recognition. See Schaghticoke Tribal Nation v. Kempthorne, 587 F. Supp. 2d 389, 421–22 (D. Conn. 
2008) (Dorsey, J.) (holding that the “Reconsidered Final Determination” of the Department of the 
Interior was not arbitrary or the result of political influence by the state of Connecticut). The Eastern 
Pequot Tribe, which, similar to the Mashantucket Pequot Tribe, traces its heritage back to the historic 
Pequot Tribe, was granted federal recognition in 2002 only to have recognition similarly rescinded in 
2005 after Connecticut again successfully argued that the Tribe failed to meet the requirements for an 
administrative recognition. The Interior Board of Indian Appeals determined that the Eastern Pequot 
Tribe did not meet the federal guidelines for recognition because the Tribe divided “into two groups in 
the early 1980s. . . . [and as such] are not the same community that existed before that time” and 
because “there was insufficient evidence of political authority or influence for the period 1913–1973.” 
Press Release, Department of the Interior, The Department of the Interior Issued Reconsidered Final 
Determination to Decline Federal Acknowledgment of the Eastern Pequot Indians of Connecticut and 
the Paucatuck Eastern Pequot Indians of Connecticut (Oct. 12, 2005) available at 
http://www.doi.gov/news/archive/05_News_Releases/051012.htm. The Mashantucket Pequot Tribe 
achieved its recognition through the political, rather than administrative, process by appealing to 
Congress directly for recognition. Even the political process of recognition proved difficult, and 
resulted in a Presidential Veto in its initial attempt. Mashantucket Pequot Indian Claims Settlement 
Bill, Veto Message, 19 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 503-04 at 1–2 (Apr. 5, 1983) (“[T]he Tribe may 
not meet the standard requirements for Federal recognition or services that are required of other tribes. 
The Federal Government has never entered into treaties with this Tribe, and the Bureau of Indian 
Affairs has never provided services to them or exercised jurisdiction over any Indian lands in 
Connecticut. . . . Extending Federal recognition to the Tribe would bypass the Department of the 
Interior’s administrative procedures that apply a consistent set of eligibility standards in determining 
whether or not Federal recognition should be extended to Indian groups.”). 
27 25 U.S.C. § 1754 (2012).   
28 The History of the Mashantucket Pequot Tribal Court, THE MASHANTUCKET (WESTERN) 
PEQUOT TRIBAL NATION, http://www.mashantucket.com/mptntchistory.aspx (last visited Sept. 24, 
2014). The first opinion rendered by the court, Lefevre v. Mashantucket Pequot Tribe, 1 Mash. Rep. 1, 
23 Ind. L. Rep. 6018 (Mashantucket Pequot Tribal Ct. 1992), involved a slip and fall injury that 
occurred in the Reservation’s bingo hall in 1988, several years before the creation of the Tribal Court 
system. The case was previously dismissed from both the Connecticut state and federal district courts 
for lack of jurisdiction, and while the decision by the federal district court essentially deprived the 
plaintiffs of a venue at a time when the Tribal Court did not exist, “the court’s decision, as harsh as it 
appears, is grounded in solid precedent and is consistent with federal policy that intrusions by federal 
courts upon tribal sovereignty be limited.” Edmond F. Leedham, III, The Indian Gaming Controversy 
in Connecticut: Forging a Balance Between Tribal Sovereignty and State Interests, Note, 13 
BRIDGEPORT L. REV. 649, 681 (1993). Unfortunately for the plaintiffs, the Mashantucket Pequot Tribal 
Court also dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction because the injury occurred before the creation of 
the court. Lefevre, 1 Mash. Rep. at 5. Apparently, there was simply no venue for the plaintiffs in this 
unfortunate case.  
29 Leedham, supra note 28, at 670 (“In February 1985, the Mashantucket Pequot Tribal Council 
opened a high stakes bingo hall on its reservation in Ledyard. Relying upon its status as a federally 
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contending that the Tribe was not excluded from the State regulation of 
bingo operations, and the Tribe took the initiative to enjoin the state from 
enforcing its bingo statutes on the Reservation.30 The federal court agreed 
with the Tribe, marking the Mashantucket Pequot Tribe’s first win in a 
series of cases asserting Tribal sovereignty over their on-Reservation 
activities.31  
In 1988, Congress passed the IGRA.32 The IGRA granted recognized 
Indian Tribes the ability to operate high-stake “Class III” gaming 
activities33 on the Reservation as long as the games were permitted by the 
State for non-Indian entities.34 Relying on Connecticut’s “Las Vegas 
Nights” statute,35 the Tribe attempted to enter into negotiations with the 
                                                                                                                          
recognized Indian tribe, the tribal council declined to seek approval for its bingo operation from the 
State of Connecticut. Moreover, the tribal council, which enacted its own Bingo Control Ordinance, 
showed no intention of conforming to Connecticut law regarding the conduct of bingo games within the 
state.”). 
30 Mashantucket Pequot Tribe v. McGuigan, 626 F. Supp. 245 (D. Conn. 1986) (Dorsey, J.).   
31 The Tribe began its bingo operations in February 1985, and at that time the Tribe stated that it 
did not “intend to conduct its bingo games either pursuant or subject to the requirements of Connecticut 
law.” Id. at 246. The case hinged on deciding “whether the tribe’s conduct of bingo games remain[ed] 
solely within its sovereignty or [was] subject to the regulation and control of the State of Connecticut 
by reason of its bingo laws.” Id. The court agreed with the Tribe, deciding that “the dominant character 
of the nature and purpose of Connecticut’s bingo laws is regulatory and the single penal statute 
included therein . . . . [is] found not to be enforceable under a grant of jurisdiction over criminal law.” 
Id. at 249. The Tribe’s motion for declaratory judgment was granted, and Connecticut was permanently 
enjoined from enforcing any of its bingo laws on the Reservation. Id. at 249–50. 
32 The IGRA was popularly known to have been the Congressional response to the Supreme Court 
of the United States’ decision in California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202 (1987), 
which held that Indian Tribes could offer, on their Reservations, any gaming activity allowed by the 
state. Id. at 211 (“In light of the fact that California permits a substantial amount of gambling activity, 
including bingo, and actually promotes gambling through its state lottery, we must conclude that 
California regulates rather than prohibits gambling in general and bingo in particular.”). Congress, 
eager to bolster the economic development and quasi-independence of the Indian Tribes, “codified the 
Cabazon Band holding [as the IGRA], giving congressional consent to high-stakes bingo operations 
conducted for tribal government purposes on tribal lands and under tribal regulations.” Matthew L.M. 
Fletcher, California v. Cabazon Band: A Quarter-Century of Complex, Litigious Self-Determination, 59 
FED. LAW., Apr. 2012, at 50, 51. 
33 Under the IGRA, Class I gaming includes “social games solely for prizes of minimal value or 
traditional forms of Indian gaming engaged in by individuals as a part of, or in connection with, tribal 
ceremonies or celebrations.” 25 U.S.C. § 2703(6) (2012). Class II gaming, the gaming that was central 
to the Cabazon Band ruling, includes “bingo” and “card games that are explicitly authorized by the 
laws of the State.” Id. § 2703(7) (2012). Class III gaming “means all forms of gaming that are not class 
I gaming or class II gaming,” which would include slot machines. Id. § 2703(8) (2012).   
34 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1) (2012) (“Class III gaming activities shall be lawful on Indian lands only 
if such activities are . . . located in a State that permits such gaming for any purpose by any person, 
organization, or entity, and conducted in conformance with a Tribal-State compact entered into by the 
Indian tribe and the State under paragraph (3) that is in effect.”). 
35 CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 7-186a–186l (repealed effective Jan. 7, 2003). One of the considered 
effects of the repeal of the Las Vegas Nights statue was the possible prevention of any future federally 
recognized Tribes, such as the shortly recognized Eastern Pequot Tribe, from claiming a right to 
operate a casino on their Reservation. See Letter from Richard Blumenthal, Conn. Attorney Gen., to 
 
 206 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:197 
State to allow Class III gaming on the Reservation. Connecticut refused to 
negotiate, and the Tribe brought the State to court to compel negotiations 
under the IGRA.36 The negotiations that followed failed to produce a 
compact, and the State and Tribe submitted final proposals to a mediator 
tasked with selecting the proposal that best adhered to the tenets of the 
IGRA.37 The mediator chose the State’s proposal, but the State refused to 
accept the compact.38 As a result, the Secretary of the Interior was 
obligated under the IGRA to select a set of procedures that would permit 
the Tribe to operate Class III gaming on their Reservation.39 A slightly 
modified version of the State’s proposal was adopted by the Secretary of 
the Interior.40 With these Gaming Procedures in place, the Tribe began 
construction of what was at that time the largest casino in the world: 
Foxwoods Resort Casino.41 The use of slot machines was never condoned 
in the State’s Las Vegas Nights statute, which meant that the Tribe was 
unable to offer the popular gaming activity in their new casino. Rather than 
lobbying for the inclusion of slot machine gaming in the Las Vegas Nights 
statute, a revenue sharing plan, in which the state would be paid one-fourth 
of the “hold”42 from slot machine operations, was implemented in the 
Memorandum of Understanding between the Mashantucket Pequot Tribe 
                                                                                                                          
Conn. Senator Kevin B. Sullivan and Conn. Representative Moira K. Lyons (Dec. 20, 2002), available 
at http://www.ct.gov/ag/lib/ag/indian/lasvegasnights.pdf (“Thus, repeal of the Las Vegas Nights statute 
prior to the conclusion of the [Bureau of Indian Affairs’ Interior Board of Indian Appeals] review [of 
the Eastern Pequot Tribe’s federal recognition determination] should not provide a legal basis for the 
Eastern Pequots to claim a right to casino gaming based on a law no longer in effect.  A federal district 
court has ruled that even federally recognized tribes cannot claim a right to casino gaming if a state 
repeals permitted gaming prior to the recognized tribes entering into a compact with the state.”). 
36 Mashantucket Pequot Tribe v. Connecticut, 737 F. Supp. 169 (D. Conn. 1990) (Dorsey, J.). The 
section of the IGRA that allowed the Tribe to compel negotiations, 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7) (2012), was 
ultimately held unconstitutional as a violation of the Eleventh Amendment. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. 
Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 75 (1996) (“[W]e have found that Congress does not have authority under the 
Constitution to make the State suable in federal court . . . .”). 
37 Notice of Opportunity to Comment on Mashantucket Pequot Gaming Procedures, 56 Fed. Reg. 
15,746 (Apr. 17, 1991). 
38 Id. (“The State . . . declined to accept the mediator’s chosen compact, i.e., the State’s 
proposal.”). 
39 Id. It is important to note that the State and Tribe follow the Gaming Procedures instead of a 
compact, though the Gaming Procedures serve an identical purpose. 
40 Notice of Final Mashantucket Pequot Gaming Procedures, 56 Fed. Reg. 24,996 (May 31, 
1991). The State proposal adopted by the Secretary to serve as the Gaming Procedures was altered only 
to add an amendment for patron tort remedies and temporary licensing by the State. Proposal of the 
State of Conn. For a Tribal-State Compact Between the Mashantucket Pequot Tribe and the State of 
Conn. at 1–2, Mashantucket v. Connecticut, Civil Action No. H89-717 (D. Conn. Apr. 17, 1991) 
[hereinafter the Gaming Procedures]. 
41 The casino opened February 15, 1992. Originally, there were planned closing and opening 
times, but after the first day, several hundred patrons were still inside at closing time. The casino has 
remained open since that day. Sokolove, supra note 26. 
42 The “hold” is equal to the total amount paid into the slot machines decreased by the total 
amount paid out as winnings. Id. 
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and Connecticut.43  
Since then, the Tribe has received the lion’s share of its revenue 
through its casino operations,44 though Foxwoods Resort Casino is far from 
the Tribe’s only business enterprise. Outside of the Reservation, the Tribe 
owns and operates several businesses, including the Lake of Isles private 
golf club and the Spa at the Norwich Inn.45 The most impressive enterprise 
owned by the Tribe remains its casino, which has grown significantly since 
it was opened in 1992. In May 2008, the Tribe opened the most recent 
expansion to its casino operations: the MGM Grand at Foxwoods Resort 
Casino.46 This contemporary hotel and casino, though bearing the popular 
MGM brand, is owned and operated by the Tribe. Recently, MGM and the 
Tribe agreed to end the licensing agreement that allowed Foxwoods Resort 
Casino to use the MGM brand.47 The MGM Grand at Foxwoods Resort 
Casino was renamed The Fox Tower to better reflect its Tribal ownership, 
while MGM remains hopeful that its brand can be put to a more profitable 
use once their ongoing bid to open their own casino in neighboring 
Massachusetts succeeds.48 The Mashantucket Pequot Tribe is considering a 
similar expansion of its operations into Massachusetts, although a recent 
                                                                                                                          
43 MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING, CONN. AND THE MASHANTUCKET PEQUOT TRIBE (Jan. 
13, 1993), available at http://www.ct.gov/dcp/lib/dcp/pdf/gaming/memorandum_of_un 
derstanding_foxwoods%5B1%5D.pdf (“The Tribe agrees that, so long as no change in State law is 
enacted to permit the operation of video facsimiles or other commercial casino games by any other 
person and no other person within the State lawfully operates video facsimiles or other commercial 
casino games, the Tribe will contribute to the State a sum [the “Contribution”] equal to twenty-five per 
cent (25%) of gross operating revenues of video facsimile games operated by the Tribe.”).    
44 Pequot II, No. 3:06cv10-12, 2012 WL 1069342, at *1 (D. Conn. Mar. 27, 2012) (“Gaming is 
the Tribe’s principal source of revenue and provides the funds to support government services and the 
general welfare of the Tribe and its members. The Tribe does have other revenue sources including a 
sales tax, a hotel occupancy tax, and an admissions tax for on Reservation transactions.”). 
45 Tribal Enterprises, THE MASHANTUCKET (WESTERN) PEQUOT TRIBAL NATION, 
http://www.mashantucket.com/enterprises.aspx (last visited Sept. 24, 2014).   
46 Brian Hallenbeck, Foxwoods, MGM Announce End to Licensing Agreement, THE DAY (Oct. 
25, 2013, 5:00 PM), http://www.theday.com/article/20131025/BIZ02/131029789/1017.  
47 Id. (“‘With MGM working toward a significant presence on the East Coast, it was the 
opportune time to review our relationship (with Foxwoods) and dissolve the licensing agreement, 
[MGM spokesman Clark] Dumont said. At this point, he added, the relationship involved only the 
licensing of the MGM Grand name and ‘no operating revenues.’”).   
48 See Matthew Sturdevant, MGM Grand at Foxwoods Renamed The Fox Tower, HARTFORD 
COURANT (Apr. 3, 2014), http://articles.courant.com/2014-04-03/business/hc-foxwoods-mgm-grand-
20140403_1_grand-pequot-tower-mashantucket-pequots-mgm-grand. While the Massachusetts 
Gaming Commission awarded MGM a license to build a casino and entertainment resort in Springfield, 
the ultimate outcome will be determined in November, when Massachusetts voters decide whether or 
not to repeal the law allowing casinos to be built in the state.  Jon Camp, Massachusetts Voters to 
Decide on Casino Law in November, WALL ST. J. ONLINE (June 24, 2014, 3:21 PM), 
http://online.wsj.com/articles/massachusetts-court-allows-ballot-measure-on-casino-law-repeal-
1403621174. 
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voter referendum may have halted that plan altogether.49 
The Foxwoods Resort Casino and the Mashantucket Pequot Tribe were 
not immune to the economic damage brought about by the Great 
Recession.50 Foxwoods Resort Casino, which has about $2.3 billion in debt 
at the time of this writing, is in negotiations with its creditors to reduce that 
debt by about $600 million.51 While there are fewer people who feel 
financially secure enough to gamble, there are signs of a modest increase 
in casino patronage as the national economy recovers.52 Whether this 
recovery will be maintained, especially considering future potential 
competition in Massachusetts, only time will tell. 
B.  Leading to Pequot II 
The Tribe advertises that it offers 5,500 slot machines in its casino.53 A 
number of these slot machines are leased to the Tribe by several non-
Indian, off-Reservation game companies. In 1997 and 1998, the Tribe 
contracted with Atlantic City Coin & Slot Co. (AC Coin), a New Jersey 
corporation, and WMS Gaming, Inc. (WMS), a Delaware corporation, to 
lease slot machines to the Tribe for use in the casino.54 The contracts with 
both AC Coin and WMS stipulated that any taxes applicable to the slot 
machines would be assumed by the Tribe.55 In 2001, the Tribe met again 
with AC Coin and WMS to renegotiate the terms of their contract. 
Specifically, the contracts were amended to state that “(1) the Tribe is not 
subject to state and local taxes; [and] (2) AC Coin or WMS will not file 
any declaration or pay any taxes with respect to gaming machines leased to 
the Tribe . . . .”56 The Tribe believed that non-Indian property leased to 
them for gaming on the Reservation could not be taxed by the state. 
Despite the changes made to the contracts, AC Coin and WMS “continued 
                                                                                                                          
49 See Matthew Sturdevant, Massachusetts Voters Reject Foxwoods’ $1 Billion Casino Plan, 
HARTFORD COURANT (Nov. 19, 2013), http://articles.courant.com/2013-11-19/business/hc-milford-
foxwoods-vote-1120-20131119_1_casino-license-casino-measure-casino-free-milford (reporting that 
voters rejected the plan).   
50 “The Pequots misjudged the market, borrowed too much and expanded unwisely. Foxwoods’s 
debt is on a scale befitting the size of the property—$2.3 billion.” Sokolove, supra note 26. 
51 Id.  
52 Id. (“Revenues have continued to fall at Foxwoods, as they have for the last half-dozen years. 
But lately, the casino’s profits have been increasing. ‘We changed our focus to profitability,’ 
[Foxwoods Chief Exectuive Scott] Butera said . . . . [W]hat he meant was that Foxwoods had stopped 
chasing unproductive customers—table-game players whose perks added up to more than their 
losses—just to increase traffic.”). 
53 Slots, FOXWOODS, http://www.foxwoods.com/slots.aspx (last visited Sept. 24, 2014). 
54 Pequot II, No. 3:06cv10-12, 2012 WL 1069342, at *1–2 (D. Conn. Mar. 27, 2012). 
55 Id. 
56 Id. at *2. 
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to pay personal property taxes until the Tribe pressured them to stop.”57  
In 2003, the accounting firm responsible for managing AC Coin’s 
taxes accidentally filed a property tax declaration with the Town of 
Ledyard.58 This declaration included a list of all the slot machines leased to 
the Tribe.59 Since receiving this declaration the town has levied a tax on 
the slot machines leased by AC Coin to the Tribe.60 Amazingly, the 
accounting firm retained by WMS made a similar blunder in 2004, when 
the firm accidentally filed a property tax declaration which included all of 
the slot machines leased by WMS to the Tribe.61 AC Coin, against the 
wishes of the Tribe, complied with all tax assessments from that point on.62 
WMS, on the other hand, paid the property tax assessed on the leased slot 
machines in 2006 under protest, and, at the behest of the Tribe, has not 
paid them since.63  
In 2006, AC Coin filed an appeal with Ledyard’s Board of Assessment 
Appeals, arguing that the slot machines’ exclusive use on the Reservation 
for Indian gaming called for the preemption of the state tax. The Board was 
unconvinced,64 and AC Coin, along with the Tribe, filed a complaint in the 
United States District Court for the District of Connecticut to request that 
Ledyard be enjoined from taxing the slot machines leased to the Tribe. 
Connecticut intervened as a defendant and filed a motion to dismiss,65 
marking the start of the Pequot Trilogy.66 
                                                                                                                          
57 Pequot III, 722 F.3d 457, 462 (2d Cir. 2013). The short time between the Tribe’s insistence that 
the tax no longer be paid and the accidental filing by the vendors’ accounting firms suggests that 2002 
was the only successful year for the contract’s tax provision. 
58 Pequot II, 2012 WL 1069342, at *2. 
59 Id. 
60 Id. 
61 Id. at *3. 
62 Id. at *2. 
63 Days before the Pequot III decision was published, “the Tribe notified the Court that AC Coin 
would cease operations on June 30, 2013.” Pequot III, 722 F.3d 457, 461 n.3 (2d Cir. 2013).  WMS 
still leases slot machines to the Tribe at the time of this writing. 
64 Id. at 462. 
65 The State claimed that the District Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the 
controversy, though the Court disagreed. Pequot I, 2007 WL 1238338, at *2 (“Taking the allegations 
[that  the tax causes the Tribe economic harm and impedes self-government] as true, as this Court must 
on a motion to dismiss, the Tribe advances a claim to enforce its own rights and interests. . . . [In 
addition,] prior district courts have rejected comity as the basis of dismissal in the context of Indian 
tribes challenging state regulation.”). The Court similarly rejected the State’s assertion that the Tribe 
failed to state a relievable claim. Id. at *3 (“Upon review of the complaint, this Court agrees that the 
Tribe has alleged a cognizable claim that the doctrines of federal preemption and tribal sovereignty 
preclude the taxation at issue.”). 
66 The Indian Trader Statutes, IRGA, and Bracker’s preemptive test may be the crux of Pequot II 
and Pequot III, but several incidental arguments were made by the State concerning jurisdiction: (1) the 
Tribe lacked standing to sue, (2) the action was outside the federal court’s jurisdiction under the Tax 
Injunction Act, and (3) the doctrine of comity compelled the court to dismiss the case. Pequot III, 722 
F.3d at 462–66. The courts in Pequot II and Pequot III agreed with the Tribe on all of the jurisdictional 
arguments. Id. at 463 (“We find that (1) the district court properly reached the merits of the case . . . .”). 
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III.  Preemption Under Bracker, the Indian Trader Statutes, and the IGRA 
A.  The Bracker Preemption Analysis 
Decided in 1980, the Supreme Court of the United States opinion in 
Bracker provides a preemption test to determine the validity of state action 
when “a State asserts authority over the conduct of non-Indians engaging 
in activity on the reservation.”67 The White Mountain Apache Tribe 
operated a logging business on their Arizona Reservation. As a part of that 
business they hired several non-Indian contractors to perform certain 
logging activities.68 One contractor, Pinetop, was hired to fell trees on the 
Reservation and then transport the timber to the Tribe’s sawmill, which 
was also located on the Reservation.69 The state sought to levy its generally 
applied motor carrier tax70 and excise fuel tax71 on Pinetop. Pinetop sued 
the State and the Tribe, which had previously agreed to bear the economic 
incidence72 of any “tax liability incurred [by Pinetop] as a result of its on-
reservation business activities,” intervened as a plaintiff after paying the 
taxes.73   
The Court made it clear that in cases concerning “on-reservation 
conduct involving only Indians . . . state law is generally inapplicable, for 
                                                                                                                          
The Tribe had standing because Indian Tribes are permitted to sue in cases where their sovereignty is 
unconstitutionally infringed by the state. “The injury in this case is neither speculative nor generalized; 
there is a real tax with measurable interference in the Tribe’s sovereignty on its reservation. The Tribe 
has standing to vindicate these interests.” Id. at 464 (citation omitted). The Tax Injunction Act limits 
certain state tax cases to the state court system by providing that “district courts shall not enjoin, 
suspend or restrain the assessment, levy or collection of any tax under State law where a plain, speedy 
and efficient remedy may be had in the courts of such State.” 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (2012). “Since we are 
required to decide whether the state tax at issue conflicts with the federal measures enacted for the 
Tribe’s protection, we have undoubted jurisdiction—notwithstanding the TIA—to perform that task. 
Recognizing this requirement, Congress bestowed on the federal courts original jurisdiction over ‘all’ 
federal claims brought by tribes.” Pequot III, 722 F.3d at 465. Finally, the case could not be dismissed 
due to comity because “there are strong federal interests in determining the contours of the Indian 
Trader Statutes and IGRA, two federal regulatory regimes that entirely occupy (and preclude state 
legislation in) fields of indeterminate size” and because “federal courts have regularly entertained 
Indian tribes’ challenges to state taxes.” Id. at 466. 
67 White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 144 (1980). 
68 Id. at 138–39. 
69 Id. at 139. 
70 This was a 2.5% tax on gross receipts applied to any “‘contract motor carrier of property’ . . .  
engaged in ‘the transportation by motor vehicle of property, for compensation, on any public 
highway.’” Id.  
71 This excise tax consisted of a charge of “eight cents per gallon of fuel used ‘in the propulsion of 
a motor vehicle on any highway within this state.’” Id. at 140 (quoting ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40-
601(A)(1) (1974)). 
72 Id. at 151. The majority made it clear that the economic incidence on the Tribe is not what led 
to preemption, but rather “the pre-emptive effect of the comprehensive federal regulatory scheme.” Id. 
at 151 n.15. The majority’s discussion of economic incidence in the opinion was unexpected, and 
“would be used against the Indians in subsequent cases.” Pomp, supra note 6, at 1129. 
73 Bracker, 448 U.S. at 140. 
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the State’s regulatory interest is likely to be minimal and the federal 
interest in encouraging tribal self-government is at its strongest.”74 The 
Court could not apply that general rule in this case, which they 
characterized as “a State assert[ing] authority over the conduct of non-
Indians engaging in activity on the reservation.”75 To resolve this, the 
Court chose to wield “a particularized inquiry into the nature of the state, 
federal, and tribal interests at stake, an inquiry designed to determine 
whether, in the specific context, the exercise of state authority would 
violate federal law.”76 
This inquiry, as applied to the facts of the case, yielded a stronger 
interest for the federal government and the Tribe. The Secretary of the 
Interior had “broad authority over the sale of timber on the reservation,”77 
and pursuant to that authority developed a series of regulations “to govern 
the harvesting and sale of tribal timber”78 and “govern[] the roads 
developed by the Bureau of Indian Affairs.”79 The Court held that “the 
federal regulatory scheme [was] so pervasive as to preclude the additional 
burdens sought to be imposed in this case,”80 and that the interest inherent 
in the federal regulations were enhanced by the “general federal policy of 
encouraging tribes ‘to revitalize their self-government’ and to assume 
control over their ‘business and economic affairs.’”81 This overwhelming 
federal interest easily outweighed the state’s interest in a “general desire to 
raise revenue,”82 and as such the Tribal interest went unaddressed. The 
“particularized” element of the preemption test was underscored in the 
Court’s conclusion. 
                                                                                                                          
74 Id. at 144. 
75 Id.  
76 Id. at 145. The Bracker analysis is best characterized as an interest balancing test, rather than a 
traditional preemption analysis. See Wagnon v. Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation, 546 U.S. 95, 101–02 
(2005) (describing Bracker as putting forth an “interest-balancing test”); Pomp, supra note 6, at 1131 
(“A classical preemption analysis would determine what Congress intended when it adopted a 
statute.”). 
77 Bracker, 448 U.S. at 145. 
78 Id. at 146–47. 
79 Id. at 147. The roads regulated by the BIA included the roads being used in this case. Id. at 
147–48. 
80 Id. at 148. 
81 Id. at 149. 
82 Id. at 150.   
Arizona made a feeble attempt at asserting its interests by referring to a “general 
desire to raise revenue,” which hardly merited any consideration. The roads used by 
the logging company were “built, maintained, and policed exclusively by the 
Federal Government, the Tribe, and its contractors.” Consequently, Arizona could 
not claim a quid pro quo to justify its tax. The reality was that Arizona had nothing 
to do with the logging operations, just the way it had no responsibility for the 
reservation in Warren Trading. 
Pomp, supra note 6, at 1129 (citations omitted) (quoting Bracker, 448 U.S. at 150). 
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Where, as here, the Federal Government has undertaken 
comprehensive regulation of the harvesting and sale of tribal 
timber, where a number of the policies underlying the federal 
regulatory scheme are threatened by the taxes respondents 
seek to impose, and where respondents are unable to justify 
the taxes except in terms of a generalized interest in raising 
revenue, we believe that the proposed exercise of state 
authority is impermissible.83    
Bracker’s preemption rule was applied and reaffirmed in Ramah Navajo 
School Board v. Bureau of Revenue,84 a decision that was authored by 
Justice Thurgood Marshall, the Justice who wrote the majority opinion in 
Bracker and introduced the Bracker balancing test into the common law.85 
Ramah, which had facts very similar to Bracker, was brought by a Tribe 
that employed a non-Indian contractor to build a school on their 
Reservation.86 The state imposed its sales tax on the materials purchased 
by the contractor for the school’s construction, and the Tribe, who 
reimbursed the contractor for these purchases, argued that the sales tax was 
preempted under Bracker.87   
The Court agreed with the Tribe, holding that the federal government’s 
“regulatory scheme precludes any state tax that ‘stands as an obstacle to 
the accomplishment of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.’”88 
Both the services provided by the state and the ultimate bearer of the sales 
tax were important factors in the Court’s analysis.   
The only arguably specific interest advanced by the State is 
that it provides services to [the non-Indian contractor] for its 
activities off the reservation. This interest, however, is not a 
legitimate justification for a tax whose ultimate burden falls 
on the tribal organization. Furthermore, although the State 
may confer substantial benefits on [the non-Indian 
contractor] as a state contractor, we fail to see how these 
benefits can justify a tax imposed on the construction of 
school facilities on tribal lands pursuant to a contract 
between the tribal organization and the non-Indian 
                                                                                                                          
83 Bracker, 448 U.S. at 151. 
84 458 U.S. 832 (1982). 
85 See Pomp, supra note 6, at 1126 (“Justice Marshall endorsed a ‘particularized inquiry into the 
nature of the state, federal, and tribal interests at stake, an inquiry designed to determine whether, in the 
specific context, the exercise of state authority would violate federal law.’ This language was 
ambiguous enough to be confused with a balancing test, which is the way some subsequent cases have 
interpreted it, although nowhere does [Bracker] use that phrase.”) (citations omitted) (quoting Bracker, 
448 U.S. at 145). 
86 Ramah, 458 U.S. at 835. 
87 Id. at 837. 
88 Id. at 845. 
 2014] MASHANTUCKET PEQUOT TRIBE V. TOWN OF LEDYARD 213 
contracting firm.89 
The Bracker decision represents the modern interpretation of the federal 
preemption of state taxes imposed on non-Indians doing business with the 
Tribes.90 Under Bracker, a state tax may be imposed on a non-Indian 
engaging in an activity with a Tribe so long as the state has an interest 
strong enough to defeat the Tribal and federal interests at stake.91 The 
federal interests are frequently divined by evaluating “the degree of federal 
regulation involved” in the case.92 Collective laws like the IGRA and the 
Indian Trader Statutes are used as evidence of a strong federal interest in 
regulating Indian gaming and trade with Indians respectively, though the 
facts of the case must be in line with the type of regulation those federal 
statutes are written for.93 
Federal interests receive the most attention in the two decisions, 
perhaps because the Courts in Pequot II and Pequot III, despite the 
opposing weight given to the identified interests, generally agree on the 
state, municipal, and Tribal interests at stake in the case. The state, as it so 
often does, has an interest in ensuring the uniform application of its 
generally applied property tax,94 the town has an interest in collecting the 
                                                                                                                          
89 Id. at 843–44. 
90  
[Bracker’s] preemption analysis has come to overshadow the Williams v. Lee 
infringement test, the second of Marshall’s two barriers to “the assertion of state 
regulatory authority over tribal reservations and its members.” . . . [P]reemption has 
come to encompass a balancing test, weighing the federal and tribal interests against 
the state’s interests, with a backdrop of tribal sovereignty that presumably places a 
thumb on the scales in favor of the Indians. The preemption test appears to take into 
account the same values as the infringement test, leading Professor Jensen to 
conclude that in the tax context “preemption has effectively swallowed 
infringement.” 
Pomp, supra note 6, at 1131 (citations omitted) (quoting Erik M. Jensen, Taxation and Doing Business 
in Indian Country, 60 ME. L. REV. 1, 62 (2008)). 
91 Ramah, 458 U.S. at 838 (“The State’s interest in exercising its regulatory authority over the 
activity in question must be examined and given appropriate weight. Pre-emption analysis in this area 
is not controlled by “mechanical or absolute conceptions of state or tribal sovereignty”; it requires a 
particularized examination of the relevant state, federal, and tribal interests.”) (quoting White Apache 
Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 145 (1980)). 
92 Barona Band of Mission Indians v. Yee, 528 F.3d 1184, 1190 (9th Cir. 2008). 
93 See infra Part III.B and Part III.C for a discussion of cases evaluating federal interest in the 
Indian Trader Statutes and the IGRA.  
94 Pequot III, 722 F.3d 457, 474–76 (2d Cir. 2013) (“The Town and State have more at stake than 
the Tribe. The economic effect of the tax on the Tribe is negligible; its economic value to the Town is 
not. The Tribe’s sovereign interest in being able to exercise sole taxing authority over possession of 
property is insufficient to outweigh the State’s interest in the uniform application of its generally-
applicable tax, particularly where, as here, there is room for both State and Tribal taxation of the same 
activity.”); Pequot II, No. 3:06cv10-12, 2012 WL 1069342, at *12 (D. Conn. Mar. 27, 2012) (“In this 
instance, the State and Town interests in the tax do not vindicate its imposition. The State’s regulation 
of the gaming is funded by the amount the Tribe provides to the State pursuant to the Gaming 
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revenue needed to provide services to the Tribe,95 and the Tribe has an 
interest in economic development and protecting its sovereignty.96 Of 
course, Pequot II and Pequot III weigh these factors in drastically different 
ways.   
In particular, the interest in protecting Tribal sovereignty has been 
progressively weakened since it was first used to completely insulate the 
Tribes from a state’s exercise of authority in Worcester v. Georgia.97 The 
                                                                                                                          
Procedures. The State and Town’s interest in compliance with the property tax on the vendors is 
diminished by the existence of legal precedent that had previously rendered the tax questionable and 
this decision finding the tax to be improper.”). 
95 Pequot III, 722 F.3d at 474–76 (“In this case, the Town has a cognizable economic interest in 
imposing the tax. The Supreme Court has recognized ‘the dependency of state budgets on the receipt of 
local tax revenues’ and ‘appreciate[s] the difficulties encountered by [local governments] should a 
substantial portion of [their] rightful tax revenue be tied up in’ litigation. The Town’s economic interest 
therefore exceeds the value of the taxes on slot machines, insofar as a ruling favorable to the Tribe 
could invite other non-Indian owners of personal property on the reservation to initiate similar 
actions.”) (citation omitted); Pequot II, 2012 WL 1069342, at *12 (“The Town’s interest in funding the 
education and bussing of the Tribe’s children is weak because such services have no nexus to the taxed 
activity of gaming or even leasing gaming equipment. The maintenance of the roads to the Reservation 
has some connection to the taxed activity because the leased gaming equipment was brought onto the 
Reservation by way of the roads and the individuals who use the gaming equipment also use the roads 
to the Reservation.”). 
96 Pequot III, 722 F.3d at 473–74 (“The tax implicates two Tribal interests—economic 
development and sovereignty over the reservation—but the parties dispute the magnitude of the tax’s 
impact on each. The economic effect of the tax on the Tribe is minimal. . . . [But t]he tax has a 
moderate effect on tribal sovereignty. . . . The State’s personal property tax, as imposed on the slot 
machines located entirely on-reservation, overlaps with the Tribe’s ability to set the restrictions to 
property rights in its sovereign territory. . . . [T]his encroachment into an area of tribal sovereignty, 
however modest, is a recognized injury that must be considered in a Bracker balancing.”); Pequot II, 
2012 WL 1069342, at *11 (“[T]he Tribe has a strong interest in its ability to self-govern as facilitated 
by the economic revenue generated by the gaming activities. . . . [T]he Tribe bears the direct burden of 
ultimately bearing the cost of the taxes, which infringes upon the revenue generated by the Tribe’s 
gaming, the Tribe’s chief source of income. Accordingly, the Tribe’s substantial interest weighs against 
the imposition of the tax.”). 
97 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 520 (1832) (“The Cherokee nation, then, is a distinct community, 
occupying its own territory, with boundaries accurately described, in which the laws of Georgia can 
have no force, and which the citizens of Georgia have no right to enter, but with the assent of the 
Cherokees themselves, or in conformity with treaties, and with the acts of congress. The whole 
intercourse between the United States and this nation, is by our constitution and laws, vested in the 
government of the United States.”). Worcester, and by extension a great deal of any preemptive power 
held in the Indian sovereignty doctrine, was reduced to a “backdrop” in McClanahan v. Arizona State 
Tax Commission, 411 U.S. 164, 171–72 (1973) (“[We do not] say that the Indian sovereignty doctrine, 
with its concomitant jurisdictional limit on the reach of state law, has remained static during the 141 
years since Worcester was decided. Not surprisingly, the doctrine has undergone considerable 
evolution in response to changed circumstances. . . . The Indian sovereignty doctrine is relevant, then, 
not because it provides a definitive resolution of the issues in this suit, but because it provides a 
backdrop against which the applicable treaties and federal statutes must be read. It must always be 
remembered that the various Indian tribes were once independent and sovereign nations, and that their 
claim to sovereignty long predates that of our own Government.”) (emphasis added). At the very least, 
it is conceded that the Indian sovereignty doctrine can bolster federal, as well as Tribal, interests in a 
Bracker test. 
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argument that sovereignty is directly affected by the imposition of a tax is 
a common one, though its effectiveness varies, even when applied to 
contractors working for the federal government. The Supreme Court of the 
United States held in Alabama v. King & Boozer98 that a federal contractor 
could not cloak their purchases in tax immunity merely by doing business 
with the federal government, even when the cost of the tax was passed on 
to the federal government.99 It is tempting to apply the same rational to 
Pequot III, but the rule is clear that 
Tribal reservations are not States, and the differences in the 
form and nature of their sovereignty make it treacherous to 
import to one notions of pre-emption that are properly 
applied to the other. The tradition of Indian sovereignty over 
the reservation and tribal members must inform the 
determination whether the exercise of state authority has 
been pre-empted by operation of federal law . . . .100   
Tribal sovereignty is fundamentally different from state or federal 
sovereignty. Whether Tribal sovereignty is offended enough to weigh in 
favor of Bracker preemption depends on the facts unique to the case. It is 
possible, and I would suggest more probable than not, that Pequot III 
would have had a different outcome if the Mashantucket Pequot Tribe was 
much less financially impressive, or if the property tax had a greater total 
impact on the Tribe’s bottom line.  
States generally have an interest in the uniform application of its laws 
and taxes. Pequot III holds this interest in high regard, considering it to be 
stronger than the federal and Tribal interest in ensuring the Tribe’s 
economic development, and additionally opines that “[t]he Town’s 
economic interest . . . exceeds the value of the taxes on slot machines, 
insofar as a ruling favorable to the Tribe could invite other non-Indian 
owners of personal property on the reservation to initiate similar 
actions.”101 The Second Circuit imagined that a ruling in favor of the 
Mashantucket Pequot Tribe would make the Reservation an easily 
accessible tax haven, a concern that has long been the bane of many Tribal 
                                                                                                                          
98 314 U.S. 1 (1941). 
99 Id. at 12 (“[T]he legal effect of the transaction which we have detailed was to obligate the 
contractors to pay for the lumber. The lumber was sold and delivered on the order of the contractors, 
which stipulated that the Government should not be bound to pay for it. It was in fact paid for by the 
contractors, who were reimbursed by the Government pursuant to their contract with it. The contractors 
were thus purchasers of the lumber, within the meaning of the taxing statute, and as such were subject 
to the [sales] tax. They were not relieved of the liability to pay the tax either because the contractors, in 
a loose and general sense, were acting for the Government in purchasing the lumber or, as the Alabama 
Supreme Court seems to have thought, because the economic burden of the tax imposed upon the 
purchaser would be shifted to the Government by reason of its contract to reimburse the contractors.”). 
100 White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 143 (1980) (citation omitted). 
101 Pequot III, 722 F.3d at 475. 
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challenges to state taxation.102 Tribal interest was defeated because the 
Court did not want to make it easy for non-Indians to avoid state taxation 
by engaging in certain types of business with the Tribe. An outcome 
favorable to the Tribe would be unfavorable to the town, and because of 
that, the town’s interest outweighs the Tribe’s. Why not vice versa?   
Pequot III’s evaluation of the town and state interest is particularly 
precarious when compared to the more cogent assessment presented by 
Pequot II. Pequot II chose to give less weight to the state interests at stake, 
saying that the state’s interest in uniform application was diminished by 
the simple existence of a precedent of allowing non-Indian activity within 
Indian country to be preempted from state taxation.103 This seems like a 
much better view of the underlying purpose of the Bracker test than what 
we see in Pequot III. After all, sometimes the just outcome will rightly 
result in inconsistent state taxation. Pequot II additionally determined that 
the state’s interest in financing the regulation of the Tribe’s gaming 
operations through the tax was weakened because that regulation was 
funded by amounts paid by the Tribe as dictated by the Gaming 
Procedures.104 This may be a little off base if taken out of context. Taxation 
would be quite cumbersome if every tax had to have a corresponding state 
action justifying that tax, but it is necessary for the tax to have a nexus with 
the taxed activity. Pequot II found that the town’s interest in bussing and 
educating Tribal children had no nexus with the taxation of leased slot 
machines on the Reservation.105 This is a significant point, as it is 
ultimately non-Indian vendors, and not the Tribe, who bear the burden of 
this tax. A nexus would have to be found in the services provided by the 
state to the non-Indian vendor. Of course, the delivery and removal of the 
leased slot machines would not be possible without roads, but even Pequot 
III only meagerly endorses the connection between road maintenance, slot 
                                                                                                                          
102 See, e.g., Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 
155 (1980) (“It is painfully apparent that the value marketed by the smokeshops to persons coming 
from outside is not generated on the reservations by activities in which the Tribes have a significant 
interest. What the smokeshops offer these customers, and what is not available elsewhere, is solely an 
exemption from state taxation. The Tribes assert the power to create such exemptions by imposing their 
own taxes or otherwise earning revenues by participating in the reservation enterprises. If this assertion 
were accepted, the Tribes could impose a nominal tax and open chains of discount stores at reservation 
borders, selling goods of all descriptions at deep discounts and drawing custom from surrounding areas. 
We do not believe that principles of federal Indian law, whether stated in terms of pre-emption, tribal 
self-government, or otherwise, authorize Indian tribes thus to market an exemption from state taxation 
to persons who would normally do their business elsewhere.”) (citation omitted) (emphasis added). The 
apparently bleak future described by the Pequot III opinion presumes that the activities and property 
related to gaming are not implicitly brought under federal control by the IGRA, which is discussed in 
greater detail in Part III.C. 
103 Pequot II, No. 3:06cv10-12, 2012 WL 1069342, at *12 (D. Conn. Mar. 27, 2012). 
104 Id. 
105 Id. 
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machine taxation, and the Tribe.106 Nexus may exist with services provided 
to the non-Indian vendor, but is that enough to weigh significantly in favor 
of the state over the Tribe? It was not in Ramah, and as such the answer 
must be an emphatic “no,” especially against the backdrop of Tribal 
sovereignty. 
Bracker cannot provide a perfect or consistent answer, as balancing 
tests in general are frequently criticized for being “rudderless, affording 
insufficient guidance to decisionmakers.”107 The courts disagree on the 
strength of each interest, which is invariably the outcome when two 
different people are asked to assign a “weight” to something as incorporeal 
as an interest. The value of a uniform tax system may mean the difference 
between order and anarchy to one judge, while a second may believe that a 
state overreaches when taxing an operation controlled by the federal 
government. The question of whether a preemption test is the best way to 
arrive at a just decision based on the unique facts of each case is outside 
the scope of this Comment. The Tribal and federal interests, weighed 
against the fairly feeble state interest in this case, is enough to resolve the 
Bracker test in favor of the Tribe. The state’s primary interest in 
uniformity is inadequate; the state’s nexus with the taxed property is 
untenable at best, and the federal government has at least two pieces of 
legislation suggesting that they prefer to engage in this relationship with 
the Tribe exclusively.   
Aside from the Bracker balancing test, finding that either the Indian 
Trader Statues or the IGRA denotes the exclusive federal regulation of a 
slot machine lease agreement between a non-Indian vendor and the Tribe 
would conclude the test in any U.S. jurisdiction, with preemption being the 
only comprehensible outcome. 
B.  The Indian Trader Statutes 
The Indian Trader Statutes, created by Congress in 1834 to prevent 
Indians from being defrauded in their trading activities,108 do not explicitly 
take away the states’ power to tax Indian Tribes. They rather, as decided in 
Warren Trading Post, “show that Congress has taken the business of 
Indian trading on reservations so fully in hand that no room remains for 
                                                                                                                          
106 Pequot III, 722 F.3d at 475 (“The Town’s economic interest in the generally applicable tax is 
therefore connected, in some respect, to the generally available services that it provides.”) (emphasis 
added). 
107 Wagnon v. Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation, 546 U.S. 95, 124 (2005) (Ginsberg, J. dissenting) 
(referencing Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 176 
(1980) (Rehnquist, J. concurring)). 
108 Cent. Mach. Co. v. Ariz. State Tax Comm’n, 448 U.S. 160, 165 (1980) (“One of the 
fundamental purposes of these statutes . . . [is] to protect Indians from becoming victims of fraud in 
dealings with persons selling goods . . . .”). 
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state laws imposing additional burdens upon traders.”109 The Court held 
that the sales tax levied on “sales made to reservation Indians on the 
reservation”110 by the federally licensed Indian trader was, as the existence 
of the Indian Trader Statues proved, outside of the authority that states 
have over the Indian Tribes.111   
Central Machinery Company v. Arizona Tax Commission112 reiterated 
and modestly extended the Indian Trader Statutes restrictions, but more 
importantly established that a state tax on sales made to reservation Indians 
could be preempted simply because the Indian Trader Statutes existed, 
regardless of the vendor’s licensing status as an Indian trader.113  Central 
Machinery, an off-Reservation farm tractor retailer, sold several tractors to 
the federally recognized Gila River Indian Tribe.114 The complaints and 
facts of the case were nearly identical to Warren Trading Post with two 
key distinctions: Central Machinery was not a federally licensed Indian 
trader and Central Machinery did not have “a permanent place of business 
on the reservation.”115 Despite the fact that the Indian Trader Statutes 
explicitly forbade unlicensed trading with Indians,116 the Court held that it 
was the simple “existence of the Indian trader statutes, then, and not their 
administration, that pre-empts the field of transactions with Indians 
occurring on reservations.”117 As the Court chose to ignore the type of 
unlicensed trading specifically prohibited by the Indian Trader Statutes and 
instead focused on their preemptive meaning, the text of the Indian Trader 
Statutes is in effect irrelevant.118 Central Machinery and Warren Trading 
                                                                                                                          
109 Warren Trading Post v. Ariz. State Tax Comm’n, 380 U.S. 685, 690 (1965).   
110 Id. at 691–92. The distinction between Indians and non-Indians, as well as whether the activity 
occurred on or off-reservation, is extremely important. Sales to non-Indians on a reservation and sales 
to Indians off reservation are both taxable. Buying from a federally licensed Indian trader became 
almost entirely meaningless in the Court’s interpretation of the Indian Trader Statutes.  
111 The tax was held to violate the Indian Trader Statutes, not to preempt them. “Justice Black’s 
opinion reads like a straightforward preemption analysis. The comprehensive, all-inclusive, detailed 
regulations occupied the field and preempted the State tax. Congress had ‘undertaken to regulate 
reservation trading in such a comprehensive way that there is no room for the States to legislate on the 
subject.’” Pomp, supra note 6, at 1010–11 (quoting Warren Trading Post Co., 380 U.S. at 692 n.18). 
The true preemptive use of the Indian Trader Statutes would come fifteen years later in Central 
Machinery Company.   
112 448 U.S. 160 (1980). 
113 Id. at 165 (“It is the existence of the Indian trader statutes, then, and not their administration, 
that pre-empts the field of transactions with Indians occurring on reservations.”). 
114 Id. at 161. 
115 Id. at 164. 
116 “Any person other than an Indian of the full blood who shall attempt to reside in the Indian 
country . . . or to introduce goods, or to trade therein, without such license, shall forfeit all merchandise 
offered for sale to the Indians or found in his possession, and shall moreover be liable to a penalty of 
$500 . . . .” 25 U.S.C. § 264 (2012).   
117 Cent. Mach. Co., 448 U.S. at 165. 
118 The Court suggests that if the matter had been pressed, Central Machinery could be considered 
a de facto federally licensed Indian trader. “Although appellant was not licensed to engage in trading 
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Post began the line of cases adjudicating federal preemption under the 
Indian Trader Statutes. When used as evidence of a strong federal interest 
in a Bracker test, the Indian Trader Statutes preempt any state sales tax 
levied on a sale made on a reservation to a reservation Indian.119 
The Supreme Court of the United States has refused to go any further 
than Central Machinery’s preemptive interpretation of the Indian Trader 
Statutes. They have declined to extend the preemptive power of the Indian 
Trader Statutes to taxes imposed on non-Indians making purchases on a 
reservation120 and have held that the Indian Trader Statutes do not prevent 
a state from implementing “quotas” on tax-exempt reservation sales.121 As 
interpreted today, preemption under the Indian Trader Statutes almost 
certainly occurs when the activity constitutes a sale on a reservation to a 
reservation Indian, though it is important to note that preemption under the 
Indian Trader Statutes has been limited solely to the imposition of state 
sales taxes.122 There is a strong federal interest implicit in the Indian Trader 
Statutes, and as such, the federal and Tribal interests will almost always 
outweigh the state interest in imposing a sales tax meeting the criteria 
above.   
The Court in Pequot II wanted to interpret the Indian Trader Statutes 
as something that the Supreme Court of the United States may have 
intended at one time in Warren Trading Post, but has since stepped away 
from in subsequent rulings. Certainly, the existence of the Indian Trader 
Statutes is strong evidence of the federal government’s interest in 
                                                                                                                          
with Indians, the Bureau of Indian Affairs had approved both the contract of sale for the tractors in 
question and the tribal budget, which allocated money for the purchase of this machinery.” Id. at 165 
n.4. “Apparently the Bureau either thought no license was required or was indifferent about whether 
one was. The Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae states without any citation that ‘in practice 
no “license” is issued for a single transaction.’” Pomp, supra note 6, at 1019 n.477 (citation omitted).   
119 State laws are preempted by federal laws when the state law “interferes or is incompatible with 
federal and tribal interests reflected in federal law, unless the state interests at stake are sufficient to 
justify the assertion of state authority.” New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 334 
(1983). “In balancing these federal, tribal, and state interests, no specific congressional intent to 
preempt state activity is required.” Cabazon Band of Mission Indians v. Wilson, 37 F.3d 430, 433 (9th 
Cir. 1994). 
120 Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 155–56 (1980) 
(“The Indian trader statutes incorporate a congressional desire comprehensively to regulate businesses 
selling goods to reservation Indians for cash or exchange, but no similar intent is evident with respect 
to sales by Indians to nonmembers of the Tribe.”) (citations omitted).  
121 Dep’t of Taxation & Fin. v. Milhelm Attea & Bros., 512 U.S. 61, 75 (1994) (“By imposing a 
quota on tax-free cigarettes, New York has not sought to dictate ‘the kind and quantity of goods and the 
prices at which such goods shall be sold to the Indians. Indian traders remain free to sell Indian tribes 
and retailers as many cigarettes as they wish, of any kind and at whatever price.”) (citation omitted). 
122 In Utah & N. Ry. Co. v. Fisher, 116 U.S. 28, 32–33 (1885), property taxes levied on non-
Indian property within a reservation were held to be valid. The decision has never been overruled, but 
since the opinion is very old, Pequot II does not discuss it and Pequot III dismisses it as being out of 
touch with contemporary law, which now requires a preemption analysis to support a property tax. 
Pequot III, 722 F.3d 457, 472 (2d Cir. 2013).   
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regulating trade with the Indian Tribes, but Pequot II’s analysis ends with 
Warren Trading Post without further deliberating on whether the 
imposition of a property tax on a leased slot machine is the type of state 
regulation that the Indian Trader Statutes preempt. Pequot II was right to 
characterize the lease as a sale to the Tribe,123 but it cannot be said that the 
Connecticut property tax was levied on that transaction. Indian trading is 
the focus of preemption under the Indian Trader Statutes, and they have 
never been held to preempt the imposition of a property tax on property 
that is temporarily leased to the Tribe.   
Pequot III followed precedent, and correctly kept the preemptive 
power of the Indian Trader Statutes limited to sales taxes. The Indian 
Trader Statutes would not preempt Connecticut’s property tax, because the 
Indian Trader Statutes have the whole of their preemptive power directed 
toward transactions with the Indians. The analysis could stop there, but 
Pequot III continues, weighing the relevant state, Tribal, and federal 
interests in a preamble to their Bracker discussion. 
The ultimate reason the Indian Trader Statutes fail to preempt the tax is 
because it is not a sales tax. However, it is important to recognize that a 
property tax on leased property presumably increases the cost passed on by 
the lessor to the lessee. Should the Indian Trader Statutes preempt a tax 
that would directly affect the trade price when the lessee is a Tribe? Not 
according to precedent. Had the tax been a sales or use tax, there would be 
no question that the strong federal interest in regulating Indian trade, 
manifested in the Indian Trader Statutes, would defeat any state interest, no 
matter how compelling. However, the tax was levied on the ownership of 
property, and as such, Pequot III correctly applied the common law rule 
when it held that “the Indian Trader Statutes do not preempt the personal 
property tax ‘expressly or by plain implication.’”124 Ruling otherwise 
would be, rightly or wrongly, a significant expansion of the preemptive 
power of the Indian Trader Statutes. 
C.  The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act 
The IGRA, drafted in 1988 by the Select Committee on Indian Affairs, 
was designed with three stated goals:  
(1) to provide a . . . means of promoting tribal economic 
development, self-sufficiency, and strong tribal governments; 
(2) to . . . shield it from organized crime and other corrupting 
                                                                                                                          
123 25 C.F.R. § 140.5(a)(6) (2014) (“Trading means buying, selling, bartering, renting, leasing, 
permitting and any other transaction involving the acquisition of property or services.”) (emphasis 
added). 
124 Pequot III, 722 F.3d at 469 (quoting Cotton Petroleum Co. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 
175–76 (1989)). 
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influences, to ensure that the Indian tribe is the primary 
beneficiary of the gaming operation, and to assure that 
gaming is conducted fairly and honestly by both the operator 
and players; and (3) to declare that the establishment of 
independent Federal regulatory authority for gaming on 
Indian lands, the establishment of Federal standards for 
gaming on Indian lands, and the establishment of a National 
Indian Gaming Commission are necessary to meet 
congressional concerns regarding gaming and to protect such 
gaming as a means of generating tribal revenue.125 
The IGRA allows a Tribe to conduct Class III gaming operations on its 
reservation if the state “permits such gaming for any purpose by any 
person, organization, or entity”126 and is “conducted in conformance with a 
Tribal-State compact entered into by the Indian tribe and the State.”127 
While the Tribal-State compact does give the state the ability to negotiate 
the imposition of some authority over the gaming operations on a 
reservation, the IGRA explicitly provides that it cannot be read as 
“conferring upon a State or any of its political subdivisions authority to 
impose any tax, fee, charge, or other assessment upon an Indian tribe or 
upon any other person or entity authorized by an Indian tribe to engage in a 
class III activity.”128   
The IGRA does not explicitly preempt any state laws, nor does it 
prevent a state from imposing a tax on gaming operations if the Tribe 
agrees to it in the Tribal-State compact.129 However, the federal interest in 
regulating Indian gaming is so strong, as is evident by the existence and 
purpose of the IGRA, that the Eighth Circuit decided in Gaming 
Corporation of America v. Dorsey & Whitney130 that “Congress . . . left 
states with no regulatory role over gaming except as expressly authorized 
                                                                                                                          
125 25 U.S.C. § 2702 (2012). More to the point on the IGRA’s federal regulatory authority over 
Indian gaming operations, the legislative history of the law suggests that the IGRA was written to 
provide 
a framework for the regulation of gaming activities on Indian lands which provides 
that in the exercise of its sovereign rights, unless a tribe affirmatively elects to have 
State laws and State jurisdiction extend to tribal lands, the Congress will not 
unilaterally impose or allow State jurisdiction on Indian lands for the regulation of 
Indian gaming activities.  
S. Rep. No. 100-446, at 5–6 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3071, 3075. 
126 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1)(B) (2012). 
127 Id. § 2710(d)(1)(C) (2012). 
128 Id. § 2710(d)(4) (2012). 
129 Id. § 2710(d)(3)(C)(iv) (2012) (“Any Tribal-State compact negotiated under subparagraph (A) 
may include provisions relating to . . . taxation by the Indian tribe of such activity in amounts 
comparable to amounts assessed by the State for comparable activities . . . .”). 
130 88 F.3d 536 (8th Cir. 1996). 
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by IGRA, and under it, the only method by which a state can apply its 
general civil laws to gaming is through a tribal-state compact.”131 In a 
Ninth Circuit case, Cabazon Band of Mission Indians v. Wilson,132 a state 
fee imposed on all off track gaming operations was held to be preempted 
by the IGRA when applied to the Indian tribes hosting off track betting on 
their Reservation.133 The IGRA made the federal interest so plain that 
preemption was essentially the only option, especially in Wilson where the 
state was actually making more money from collecting the fee from the 
Tribe than the Tribe made through its gaming operations.134 The analysis in 
Wilson yielded a stronger interest for the federal government because the 
tax was directly imposed on an Indian gaming activity.135   
Most relevant to Pequot II and Pequot III, though not binding in either 
case, was the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Barona Band of Mission Indians 
v. Yee.136 In Yee, the Tribe challenged the imposition of a state sales tax on 
the materials purchased by the Tribe’s non-Indian contractor for an 
expansion of the Tribe’s casino.137 The Court disagreed with the Tribe, 
                                                                                                                          
131 Id. at 546. The Eight Circuit suggested that the drafters of the IGRA “intended to expressly 
preempt the field in the governance of gaming activities on Indian lands. Consequently, Federal courts 
should not balance competing Federal, State, and tribal interests to determine the extent to which 
various gaming activities are allowed.” Id. at 544 (emphasis added).   
132 37 F.3d 430 (9th Cir. 1994). 
133 Id. at 435. 
134 Id. at 433 (“The federal interests before us are clearly set forth in the language of IGRA itself. 
Intended to ‘promot[e] tribal economic development, self-sufficiency, and strong tribal governments, 
IGRA seeks to ‘ensure that the Indian tribe is the primary beneficiary of the gaming operation.’”) 
(quoting 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701(1)–(2) (2012)). 
135 Wilson, 37 F.3d at 433–35. The federal interest was held to be ensuring that the IGRA 
succeeded in its stated purpose “to ‘promot[e] tribal economic development, self-sufficiency, and 
strong tribal governments,’ . . . [and thus] to “ensure that the Indian tribe is the primary beneficiary of 
the gaming operation.” Id. at 433 (quoting 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701(1)–(2) (2012)). The federal interest was 
stymied by the State’s tax, especially when it was determined that the State collected more revenue 
from the gaming operations than the Tribes did. Id. at 433. The Tribal interest was determined to be the 
“commitment to operation of their gaming operations.” Id. at 435 (quoting the lower court’s correct 
interest assessment in Cabazon Band of Indians v. California, 788 F. Supp. 1513, 1521 (E.D. Cal. 
1992)). It was determined that whether or not the value of gaming operations occurred on or off the 
reservation was inconsequential. 
[T]he Bands have invested significant funds and effort to construct and to operate 
wagering facilities and to attract patrons. It is not necessary . . . that the entire value 
of the on-reservation activity come from within the reservation’s borders. It is 
sufficient that the Bands have made a substantial investment in the gaming 
operations and are not merely serving as a conduit for the products of others. 
Id. at 435. Finally, the State’s interest was decided to be the uniform regulation of off track gaming 
operations. Id. While valid, the state interest is weakened “because IGRA specifically recognizes such 
state regulation and establishes a mechanism—the compacts—by which [the Tribes] can reimburse the 
State for regulatory costs, outside of the State tax structure.” Id. “The express objectives of IGRA, 
when combined with the Bands’ interests, preclude the application of the State’s license fee.” Id.  
136 528 F.3d 1184 (9th Cir. 2008). 
137 Id. at 1186. 
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holding that the  
IGRA’s comprehensive regulation of Indian gaming does not 
occupy the field with respect to sales taxes imposed on third-
party purchases of equipment used to construct the gaming 
facilities. IGRA’s core objective is to regulate how Indian 
casinos function so as to “assure the gaming is conducted 
fairly and honestly by both the operator and players.”138 
The outcomes in Wilson and Yee demonstrate that the IGRA explicitly 
preempts state taxes that are directly levied on a Tribe’s gaming 
operations.139 A Court must decide what constitutes a gaming operation 
and whether or not the federal interest in the IGRA is targeted toward the 
activity that the state is attempting to tax.  
 In this case, it must be decided whether the property tax impacts a 
gaming operation intended to be exclusively regulated by the federal 
government under the IGRA. If the answer is yes, then there would be 
almost no state interest strong enough to defeat the federal interest in 
regulating Indian gaming operations. Pequot III, in deciding that the IGRA 
was not applicable to the case at hand, conceded this point when they 
adopted the Eighth Circuit’s decision in Whitney, agreeing that under the 
IGRA “the only method by which a state can apply its general civil laws to 
gaming is through a tribal-state compact.”140 Rather than engage in a 
lengthy discussion of whether or not the property tax infringes on the 
federal government’s IGRA interest, Pequot III states unequivocally that 
“under IGRA, mere ownership of slot machines by the vendors does not 
qualify as gaming, and taxing such ownership therefore does not interfere 
                                                                                                                          
138 Id. at 1193. Of course, this conveniently leaves out the IGRA’s very relevant core objectives of 
encouraging Tribal economic development and ensuring that the Tribe is the primary beneficiary of the 
gaming operation. 
139 While Wilson is almost certainly correct in its interpretation of the federal interest implicated 
in the IGRA, there has been some criticism of the decision in Yee.   
What struck me in the opinion was the anti-tribal tone of the decision. After 
mentioning that the tribe’s “right of territorial autonomy is significantly 
compromised by the Tribe’s invitation to the non-Indian subcontractor to 
theoretically consummate purchases on its tribal land for the sole purpose of 
receiving preferential tax treatment,” the court added that the tribal interest in 
economic self-sufficiency was diminished because the commercial activity was 
“rigged” to trigger a tax exemption, and that such tribal interest “lessens in the 
specific context of a multi-million casino expansion.” Finally the court mentioned 
that the state did have a strong interest in preventing an Indian casino from 
“manipulating” its tax laws to shop tax exemptions to local businesses. 
Alex Tallchief Skibine, The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act at 25: Successes, Shortcomings, and 
Dilemmas, 60 FED. LAW., Apr. 2013, at 35, 39. Professor Skibine also compares the dissimilar 
preemption outcomes of Yee and Pequot II, albeit very briefly. Id. 
140 Pequot III, 722 F.3d 457, 470 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting Gaming Corp. of Am. v. Dorsey & 
Whitney, 88 F.3d 536, 546 (8th Cir. 1996)). 
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with the ‘governance of gaming.’”141 Pequot II, with equal confidence, 
takes the opposite view, stating that the “the instant commercial activity, 
the leasing of class III gaming equipment, is not peripheral to IGRA’s core 
objective, the regulation of the functioning of the Tribe's casino.”142 
Neither court substantially supports their conclusions, though they are 
certainly right to do so since there is no binding support for either 
determination. The question of whether the leasing of slot machines from 
non-Indian vendors qualifies as a gaming operation is one of first 
impression. 
Pequot III cites to Yee in determining that the tax was not preempted 
by the IGRA.143 In holding that the IGRA “does not occupy the field with 
respect to sales taxes imposed on third-party purchases,”144 the Ninth 
Circuit in Yee decided that the IGRA was not indicative of a federal 
interest in preempting a sales tax imposed on a non-Indian party contracted 
by a Tribe to build a gaming facility.145 The Tribal-State compact was not 
evaluated as part of the IGRA preemption analysis in Yee, as the court 
determined the issue was “outside the scope of the compact.”146 Yee quotes 
In re Indian Gaming Related Cases147 to support this conclusion, saying 
“[s]tates cannot insist that compacts include provisions addressing subjects 
that are only indirectly related to the operation of gaming facilities.”148 Yee 
relies on In re to exclude the compact from consideration altogether, 
presumably because it is the Ninth Circuit’s view that the taxation of 
property used to construct a casino on a reservation cannot be related to 
gaming activities and is therefore not includable in a compact. The reliance 
on In re to exclude the compact is unusual, especially considering that the 
opinion interpreted direct relationships to gaming activity “broadly.”149 In 
                                                                                                                          
141 Pequot III, 722 F.3d at 470. 
142 Pequot II, No. 3:06cv10-12, 2012 WL 1069342 at *9 (D. Conn. Mar. 27, 2012). 
143 Pequot III, 722 F.3d at 470. 
144 Yee, 528 F.3d at 1193.  
145 Id. (“Extending IGRA to preempt any commercial activity remotely related to Indian 
gaming—employment contracts, food service contracts, innkeeper codes—stretches the statute beyond 
its stated purpose.”). 
146 Id. at 1193 n.4. In this footnote, the Court reaffirmed its stance that “[t]he question before us is 
properly framed as a tax levied on a non-Indian tribe.” Presumably, they meant to frame the issue as a 
tax on a non-Indian contractor.  
147 147 F. Supp. 2d 1011 (N.D. Cal. 2001). 
148 Yee, 528 F.3d at 1193 n.4 (quoting In re Indian Gaming Related Cases, 147 F. Supp. 2d at 
1018). 
149 In re Indian Gaming Related Cases, 147 F. Supp. 2d at 1017–18. (“The Court reads § 
2710(d)(3)(C), and specifically § 2710(d)(3)(C)(vii), more broadly than [the Tribal plaintiff] does. The 
committee report of the Senate Select Committee on Indian Affairs describes the subparts of § 
2710(d)(3)(C) as ‘broad areas.’ See S. Rep. No. 100-446, at 14 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
3071, 3084. Consistent with this description, the Court interprets ‘subjects that are directly related to 
the operation of gaming activities’ to include any subject that is directly connected to the operation of 
gaming facilities.”). 
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re Indian Gaming Related Cases advocates the position that, while states 
should not be allowed to insist on provisions indirectly related to gaming, 
the language of a compact should absolutely be considered in cases where 
the Tribe agrees with the state on substantial terms related to gaming in a 
fairly negotiated compact under the IGRA, even in cases were those terms 
favor the state. Yee provided insufficient justification for concluding that 
casino construction was unrelated to gaming, and Pequot III’s IGRA 
analysis suffers for its reliance on Yee.150 
Assuming the interpretation of a compact is germane to an IGRA 
preemption consideration, it is important to revisit the Gaming Procedures 
governing the relationship between Connecticut and the Mashantucket 
Pequot Tribe. The Gaming Procedures define a gaming operation as “any 
enterprise operated by the Tribe on its Reservation for the conduct of any 
form of Class III gaming in any gaming facility.”151 The Gaming 
Procedures prohibit the state from taxing a gaming operation, unless 
explicitly authorized in the section allowing the state to assess and collect 
the cost of regulatory expenses.152 It follows from the “gaming operation” 
definition that slot machines, a necessary tool for Class III gaming, would 
be considered a part of a gaming operation. The crucial question is whether 
leasing Class III gaming equipment is part of a gaming operation. If it is, 
then a property tax on that equipment ought to be preempted under the 
IGRA.  
Ultimately there is no right or wrong answer, at least where controlling 
precedent is concerned. Pequot II was correct in holding that the tax 
impacted an aspect of the Tribe’s gaming operations.153 After all, the 
possession of slot machines is the first, most necessary step to participating 
in a Class III gaming operation permitted under the IGRA. Pequot III, 
meanwhile, is correct in holding that the tax is to be levied on the non-
Indian lessors of the slot machines rather than the Tribe, while 
simultaneously acknowledging that the Gaming Procedures forbid state 
taxation of a gaming operation not explicitly outlined within the Gaming 
                                                                                                                          
150 Pequot III, 722 F.3d 457, 470 (2d Cir. 2013). 
151 Gaming Procedures, supra note 40, at 5. An “enterprise” is defined as “any individual, trust, 
corporation, partnership, or other legal entity of any kind other than a tribal enterprise wholly owned by 
the Mashantucket Pequot Tribe.” Id. at 4.   
152 Id. at 50–51 (“Nothing in this Compact shall be deemed to authorize the State to impose any 
tax, fee, charge or assessment upon the Tribe or any Tribal gaming operation except for charges 
expressly authorized pursuant to section 11 of this Compact.”). 
153 Pequot II, No. 3:06cv10-12, 2012 WL 1069342 at *9 (D. Conn. Mar. 27, 2012) (“However, 
the instant commercial activity, the leasing of class III gaming equipment, is not peripheral to IGRA’s 
core objective, the regulation of the functioning of the Tribe’s casino. The fact that the Gaming 
Procedures afford the State authority to register and investigate vendors of the class III gaming 
equipment reflects that the leasing of the equipment is within IGRA’s protective framework and 
constitutes engaging in class III gaming.”). 
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Procedures.154 Under Dorsey & Whitney, this caveat in the Gaming 
Procedures would support the arguments of the Mashantucket Pequot 
Tribe, but only if the deciding Court agrees that non-Indian vendor slot 
machine leasing is connected to the gaming operation.155 If one were to 
decide the case with Yee as precedent, it can be fairly concluded that the 
taxation of property owned by non-Indians is always unaffected by the 
IGRA and could only be preempted under a Bracker test, even in cases 
where that property is involved in a gaming operation. But Yee failed to 
consider the economic purpose of the IGRA or to adequately justify its 
conclusion that casino construction was outside the scope of the IGRA, and 
it is reasonable to conclude, even under Yee’s improperly narrow 
interpretation, that the possession of the slot machines for a gaming 
purpose by the Tribe is within the regulatory control of the IGRA.   
As a weight in a Bracker analysis, it is significant that the IGRA 
requires a state to participate in the regulation of the Tribe’s gaming 
operation through the negotiation process,156 whereas other statutes, like 
the Indian Trader Statutes, give exclusive regulatory responsibility to the 
federal government.157 The absence of state participation in the taxed 
activities in Bracker and Ramah weighed heavily against the state interest 
in imposing the tax. Connecticut is not a bystander in the Mashantucket 
Pequot Tribe’s gaming operation, but neither is it uncompensated for its 
participation.158 The Gaming Procedures provide procedures for the state to 
be reimbursed for their services to the Tribe, and clearly forbid any other 
state taxation on a gaming operation. As the state cannot claim to be 
levying the tax to recoup on services provided to the Tribe, and because the 
slot machines are so integral to the existence of the Tribe’s Class III 
gaming operation, the participation of the state in the gaming process is not 
a significant factor in either the Bracker balancing test or the IGRA 
                                                                                                                          
154 Pequot III, 722 F.3d at 470–71 (“While the Gaming Procedures prohibit State taxation of ‘any 
Tribal gaming operation’ other than those explicitly permitted, Gaming Procedures § 17(f), they are 
silent as to taxes imposed on a third party’s ownership of slot machines on the Tribe’s land, which, as 
explained above, is not ‘gaming.’ Absent the Gaming Procedures, IGRA would not preempt the tax. 
With the Gaming Procedures, which are silent on the question of state taxation of the vendor’s 
property, the analysis is unchanged.”). 
155 Gaming Corp. of Am. v. Dorsey & Whitney, 88 F.3d 536, 546 (8th Cir. 1996) (“Congress thus 
left states with no regulatory role over gaming except as expressly authorized by IGRA, and under it, 
the only method by which a state can apply its general civil laws to gaming is through a tribal-state 
compact. Tribal-state compacts are at the core of the scheme Congress developed to balance the 
interests of the federal government, the states, and the tribes.”). 
156 See supra notes 31–42 (recounting the IGRA mandated negotiation process between 
Connecticut and the Mashantucket Pequot Tribe). 
157 See supra Part III.B (discussing the Indian Trader Statutes). 
158 Gaming Procedures, supra note 40, at 37–39 (providing the procedure by which Connecticut 
will “annually make an assessment sufficient to compensate the State for the reasonable and necessary 
costs of regulating gaming operations and conducting law enforcement investigations pursuant to this 
compact”). 
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preemption analysis. 
There is no controlling precedent or bright-line rule for how far the 
preemptive power of the IGRA goes, so both Pequot II and Pequot III 
enjoy the privilege of being technically correct with their interpretations of 
the interests manifested by the IGRA. The IGRA was not written to protect 
non-Indian vendors from state taxation, but it was written to protect the 
economic development of a Tribe’s gaming industry.159 In this case, I 
believe the economic purpose of the IGRA and the language of the Gaming 
Procedures is sufficient to preempt Connecticut’s property tax without 
weighing the interests in a Bracker analysis. 
IV.  CONCLUSION  
The Supreme Court today would almost certainly agree with the 
opinion in Pequot III. After all, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals made 
an appropriate ruling based on their evaluation of the federal, state, and 
Tribal interests at stake. While Pequot III applied the law in a perfectly 
reasonable way, Pequot II offers what I believe to be the more convincing 
opinion. 
The revitalization of the Indian Tribes is arguably the central 
motivation behind the IGRA, which was developed to make it especially 
easy for Tribes to participate in the gaming industry.160 It follows that the 
preemption of state taxes affecting that gaming industry, however slightly, 
would be implicit in the IGRA’s goal of economic development. The 
IGRA’s preemptive power is augmented when, as in this case, the 
negotiated Tribal-State gaming compact explicitly details how the state 
will be reimbursed for the regulatory costs associated with the Tribe’s 
gaming operation and rejects all other taxation.    
Given the increasingly minute importance afforded to Tribal 
sovereignty, it may simply be the rule that the right of a state to tax an 
activity with a minimal nexus cannot be defeated by the existence of 
federal oversight. Of course, future judges may choose to reintroduce and 
reinvigorate the importance of protecting Tribal sovereignty and reverse 
the marginalization of what was once an important facet of federal 
supremacy.   
                                                                                                                          
159 25 U.S.C. § 2702 (2012) (stating that the IGRA’s purpose included providing the “means of 
promoting tribal economic development, self-sufficiency, and strong tribal governments . . . .”). 
160 See supra notes 124–27 (discussing the IGRA’s purpose and gaming provisions). 

